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Abstract:
Large-scale societal crises require individuals and organizations to make sense of ambiguous situations. Nowadays,
users use social media such as Twitter to seek and contribute crisis-related information. However, contradictory cues
such as rumors increasingly break up their sense- and decision-making processes. We examine how sense-breaking
(i.e., rumor-supporting and -correction messages) impact rumor spreading and how different user archetypes contribute
to this process. Against the theory of connective action as a backdrop, we conducted a case study on the German
Chemnitz 2018 riots and associated Twitter communication. With an analysis combining semi-automated content
analysis and social network analysis, we identified five rumor-spreading networks. Characteristic user behavior and
deduced user archetypes revealed that impeded connective action negatively impacted rumor correction. From those
findings, we theoretically derive a concept that we call “connective sense-breaking”; that is, connective efforts by
involved user archetypes and their supporting and correction behavior to achieve information consensus. This new
perspective on rumor spreading provides IS researchers with an expedient lens for future work and helps crisis
communication stakeholders such as emergency management agencies to define their role in rumor spreading and,
consequently, improve their ad hoc decision-making.
Keywords: Rumor Correction, Social Media, Crisis Communication, Sense-making, Sense-breaking.
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Introduction

In crises, individual societal members face unusual and challenging events that leave them feeling uncertain
with the need to make sense of unfamiliar situations (Oh et al., 2013; Weick et al., 2005). However,
individuals often perceive mainstream media’s information as one-sided and sensational (Oh et al., 2013).
Thus, individuals turn to social media to seek and share information, to express opinions (Stieglitz et al.,
2017) and inner thoughts (Heverin & Zach, 2012), or to bridge knowledge gaps between a perceived event
and factual information explaining it (Li & Cho, 2021; Oh et al., 2013). Ambiguous situations and the
increasing salience of self-organizing information systems such as social media have caused rumors that
impact the individual sense-making process to circulate (Oh et al., 2013). Rumors may transpire as
misinformation or disinformation. Misinformation refers to unintentionally false propositional content,
whereas disinformation refers to purposely false propositional content (Mingers & Standing, 2018). Since
one cannot readily determine the intention behind a rumor, we focus on misinformation, which researchers
have found to spread quickly via social media (Shu et al., 2017). User archetypes such as emergency
management agencies (EMA), media organizations, and individuals make efforts to keep information
accurate by correcting rumors (Jong & Dückers, 2016; Simon et al., 2015). To successfully correct rumors,
these actors rely on timely and accurate information that stems from inside organizations and/or other
sources. People’s susceptibility to rumors and misinformation dampens social media’s utility for EMA
(Bunker et al., 2017; Maddock et al., 2015). Moreover, a rumor oftentimes spreads more effectively than its
correction (Shin et al., 2017; Wang & Zhuang, 2018). Consequently, users experience a contorted version
of reality and might continue to construct meaning and act based on misinformation. Corrections that diffuse
poorly through social media create a situation in which fewer users encounter corrective messages on social
media. Thus, users miss out on corrections that would help to understand situations accurately. This
problem underlines the need for correction messages to diffuse throughout social media effectively and
leads to our first research question, which we address to more clearly understand the mechanics by which
rumors spread in crisis communication:
RQ1: How do rumors circulate in crisis communication on social media?
To address this question, we divide it into two parts: we examine who disseminates rumors and what
behaviors in other people lead users to spread rumors. Therefore, we ask:
RQ1a: What user archetypes participate in spreading rumors?
RQ1b: What behaviors in other users affect the spreading of rumors?
From a cognitive psychology perspective, actively correcting or questioning discerned rumors belongs to
the sense-breaking concept. It has its origin in sense-making theory and involves destroying or breaking
down meaning, which creates a void that one must fill (Pratt, 2000). The sense-breaking and sense-making
concepts have their roots in organizational studies that used them to explain individual and group decision
making (Weick, 1993). Information systems (IS) research has also applied this theoretical lens in various
domains such as distributed work (Vlaar et al., 2008) or crisis communication on social media (Mirbabaie et
al., 2020a). In this study, we draw on sense-breaking, which occurs when new environmental aspects and
information that contradicts the previous meaning individuals constructed becomes salient to them (Giuliani,
2016). Consequently, both communicating a rumor and its correction can constitute sense-breaking if the
information creates a contradiction (Mirbabaie & Marx, 2019). In this study, we argue that, since ambiguity
and uncertainty characterize crisis communication (Oh et al., 2010; Runyan, 2006), rumors and their
correction contribute to how people construct meaning. Based on this argument, we examine how rumor
correction relates to sense-breaking. Specifically, we examine:
RQ2: How does rumor correction affect sense-breaking?
In addressing this question, we focus on understanding why benign efforts (rumor correction) to achieve
sense-breaking tend to be rather unsuccessful, how rumor spreading influences the sense-breaking
process, and what practices may increase the rate at which sense-breaking succeeds.
To contribute to the literature on rumor spreading, we further assume a holistic perspective by drawing on
the theoretical concept connective action. Researchers have often used this concept to explain social
movements. It describes “new forms of collective engagement whereby multiple actors come together
spontaneously and informally…and engage in coparticipation and coproduction of content with the use of
social media” (Vaast et al., 2017, p. 1180). The concept, which researchers spun-off from the theory of
collective action, posits that collective identity motivates individuals’ engagement (Bennett & Segerberg,
2013). Rumor spreading on social media, however, constitutes connective action as user archetypes pursue
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individual interests with social media mobilizing and organizing the action dynamics (in this case, rumor
correction).
In this paper, we use data from a case study revolving around the 2018 Chemnitz riots, a man-made crisis
that involved mass protests that right-wing extremist groups induced against immigrants in Germany. The
protests resulted in violent rallies and public distress across the nation. In particular, we analyzed a dataset
that comprised 1,180,689 Twitter postings using semi-automated content analysis and social network
analysis.
Our results contribute to IS research by providing insights into how rumors and their corrections spread on
social media and, more importantly, what factors and behaviors inhibit sense-breaking (e.g., rumor
correction) and how one can overcome them. Unpacking the theoretical underpinnings of the connective
action framework in combination with sense-breaking will support us in developing a notion that helps to
better understand rumor spreading. From a practical perspective, crisis communication stakeholders can
find value in this study as we derive implications for management on how to navigate rumor spreading and
improve decision-making during crisis events.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we explain sense-breaking’s theoretical foundation and
connective action logics while reviewing related work. In Section 3, we describe our research design. In
Section 4, we show our results. In Section 5, we discuss our results and their implications for society,
practice, and research. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper.

2
2.1

Theoretical Background
Social Media User Archetypes in Crisis Communication

Individual social media users influence one another’s ability to cognitively deal with a crisis when sharing
information and when actors collectively construct meanings (Heverin & Zach, 2012). In this context,
scholarship has put some effort into disclosing which social media archetypes are prevalent in crisis
situations (Mirbabaie & Zapatka, 2017; Stieglitz et al., 2017; Stieglitz et al., 2018a). Stieglitz et al. (2017),
for example, identified media organizations, governmental organizations, private persons, public persons
(journalists), public persons (celebrities), public persons (politicians) and public persons (other). In this case
study of the 2017 Brussels bombings, media organizations, public persons (journalists), and governmental
organizations functioned as user archetypes that distributed information to large audiences, while public
persons (celebrities, politicians, other) helped to interpret the events. Media organizations are highly active
on social media during early crisis stages, which reflects the salience of users in the need for information.
These and other results (e.g., Mirbabaie & Zapatka, 2017) illustrate that certain user archetypes influence
crisis communication in self-organized networks without pronounced organizational control, which can
significantly impact sense-making (Mirbabaie & Zapatka, 2017; Stieglitz et al., 2017). Users who share
information not based on facts (e.g., rumors) that turn out to be misinformation or even intentionally
deceptive information provision (i.e., fake news or disinformation) may severely influence crisis
communication (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2018).
Accordingly, several studies have investigated rumors and misinformation on social media during crisis
communication. Some support the notion that the crowd follows a self-correcting mechanism; that is, the
assumption that users will naturally identify misinformation, challenge it, and, in the end, correct it (Jong &
Dückers, 2016). However, studies have also revealed that corrections to misinformation tend to attract
smaller (re-)tweet volumes (Andrews et al., 2016; Maddock et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2017; Wang & Zhuang,
2018). Andrews et al. (2016) found the EMA as an archetype that can slow down the extent to which rumors
diffuse throughout social media via posting denials (Andrews et al., 2016). Thus, EMA seem to have the
necessary authority and trust to correct the information space during crises but seldom can do so because
they lack the popularity and/or reach (Andrews et al., 2016; Maddock et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2017; Wang
& Zhuang, 2018). Similarly, Starbird et al. (2018) found that journalists (including organizations that produce
news and professional journalism associations) can impact rumor spreading. Specifically, they found
journalists to participate in spreading rumors and misinformation but also as more likely to deny them
compared to other user archetypes.
To better understand how rumors and misinformation diffuse on social media during crisis situations, one
can find it helpful to take a closer look at user behavior. Maddock et al. (2015) distinguish between seven
distinct behaviors in this regard; namely, misinformation, speculation, hedge, question, correction,
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neutral/other, and unrelated. In particular, we can understand questioning and correction tweets as sensebreaking as they demand for action or information that entails new meaning.

2.2

Sense-making and Sense-breaking

Researchers have widely adopted the sense-making and sense-breaking concepts in the crisis
communication context (Heverin & Zach, 2012; Oh et al., 2015). Sense-making refers to giving meaning to
ambiguous and uncertain situations (Weick et al., 2005) and allows individuals to find common ground for
further action (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Oh et al., 2015). Even when individuals engage in sense-making
on their own, others (whether present or imagined/implied) influence their thoughts, feelings, and actions
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). When individuals engage in sense-making on social media, they may
encounter some challenges, such as information overload due to the vast amount of information on social
media (Oh et al., 2013; Seidel et al., 2017). Furthermore, social media may dampen information’s
comprehensibility as users need to affiliate messages with respective conversations (conversation
disentanglement) and messages (i.e., which messages does a certain message reply to) (coherence)
(Abbasi et al., 2018).
Sense-breaking is linked to sense-making. Sense-breaking occurs when individuals face environmental
cues that do not match their constructed meaning (Giuliani, 2016; Vlaar et al., 2008). As a consequence,
they perceive the constructed meaning as illogical and unsupportable (Vlaar et al., 2008), which results in
a meaning gap (Pratt, 2000). In the organizational context, researchers have found knowledge and
experience asymmetries in addition to ambiguous and novel tasks to trigger sense-breaking acts, which
benefit the organization as they increase the likelihood of congruent understanding among distributed team
members who build the basis for actions. Without sense-breaking, individuals would continuously
incorporate new information into existing meaning constructions rather than challenging these constructions
(Vlaar et al., 2008). Pratt (2000) studied sense-breaking in an organizational context and identified it as a
crucial practice for an organization to manage employees’ identities. Successful sense-breaking will then
lead to seekership, “a sense of identity-related discontentment that results in a drive to finding meaning”
(Pratt, 2000, p. 469) followed by a process that leads one to acquire new sense.
In another case study, Bisel et al. (2017) analyzed sense-breaking in an organization that focused on
training elite gymnasts without harmful and abusive training practices. They analyzed how the organization’s
founder became aware of unethical training practices and how she led others to resist them. Through
formulating top-down sense-breaking messages, coaches started developing training practices that
concurred with those cues. These practices were enacted, selected, and retained collectively (Bisel et al.,
2017; see also Jennings & Greenwood, 2003; Weick et al., 2005). This case study also underlines how
sense-making and sense-breaking can lead to institutional changes. The authors found that experiences
that challenge one’s ethics or identity can trigger sense-making processes that, in turn, might lead to sensebreaking and someone to establish an alternative view.
Although rooted in an organizational context, sense-breaking poses a useful theoretical concept for the
crisis communication domain. No or ineffective sense-breaking can affect crisis communication negatively
as users do not challenge rumors and misinformation and will continue to diffuse while corrections fail to
have the desired effect.

2.3

Theory of Connective Action

For a holistic perspective on (self-)organization during crises on social media, with different user archetypes
engaging in sense-breaking, we draw on the theory of connective action. Bennet and Segerberg (2013)
distinguish between two organizational logics: collective action and connective action. Different dynamics
and organizational forms characterize these logics. Researchers developed the theory of collective action
before the digital media and communication technology that we know today emerged. Therefore, technology
does not play a central role in the traditional theory of collective action (Bimber et al., 2005). In general, it
encompasses “collective activities that seek to extend the interests of a particular social group” (Zheng &
Yu, 2016, p. 293). Pursued objectives require a collective identity (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Leong et al.,
2018; van Zomeren et al., 2008).
Researchers developed the logic of connective action as a reaction to new forms of social movements that
used digital media to mobilize and organize action. This process “enables personal framing of
communication…co-ordinated in networks organized by both human and technological agents” (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2013, p. 29). In contrast to collective action, technology has a central role in the logic of
connective action, which the interplay between personal interests rather than a collective identity guides. In
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this study’s context, connective action relates to social media archetypes facing the common problem of
rumor exposure, with rumor correction exemplifying a connective effort to solve this problem. For the sake
of our theoretical argument, we henceforth build on the theory of connective action to understand the rumor
spreading phenomenon. Connective action has garnered attention from several scholars (Brünker et al.,
2020; Leong et al., 2018; Lundgaard et al., 2018; Vaast et al., 2017) who have evidenced it in different
contexts that range from environmental disasters (Vaast et al., 2017) to racism (Lundgaard et al., 2018) and
political protests (Dessewffy & Nagy, 2016). These studies underline the need to approach digitally
networked action from a broader perspective than traditional collective action alone.
While individuals still engage in collective action (i.e., they join established groups and adopt a collective
identity and shared ideas and behavior) (e.g., Chan, 2017; Ibsen, 2016), individualized actions become a
common occurrence with digital media taking over organizations’ roles in mobilizing and organizing actions
(e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Johri et al., 2018; Vaast et al., 2017). Individuals participating in
connective action share a common problem and strive to seek a common solution. However, they are less
prone to tradeoff personal beliefs for collective beliefs and a collective identity (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).
Instead, individuals seek more personalized means to raise their voice that are embedded in their personal
lifestyles and that they share in networks. Table 1 summarizes connective action’s key characteristics and
how they differ from its collective counterpart.
Table 1. Overview of the Logics of Connective and Collective Action
Connective action

Collective action

Definitions

Describes the technologically mediated
interplay between personal communication,
motivated by individual interests, which
results in action geared towards solving a
common problem (Bennett & Segerberg,
2013).

Role of identity

No need to adopt a collective identity and to
trade-off personal beliefs for collective
beliefs (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).

Requires a collective identity (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2013; Leong et al., 2018; van
Zomeren et al., 2008) (e.g., in a community or
institution).

Action frames

Action frames are easy to personalize and
inclusive (i.e. they allow participation based
on individual reasons) (personal action
frames) (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Leong
et al., 2018; Lundgaard et al., 2018)

Action frames are exclusive and reinforce beliefs
and shared values. They require individuals to
adopt collective ideologies and beliefs (collective
action frames) (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013;
Lundgaard et al., 2018)

Organization

Individuals share ideas and action based on
their own motivations rather than external
incentives; they require little or no formal
organizational control (Bennett & Segerberg,
2013).

Organizations need to coordinate individuals to
motivate them to participate and to overcome
free-riding effects (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013;
Flanagin et al., 2006; Lundgaard et al., 2018;
Olson, 1965).

Technology changes an action’s dynamics. It
acts as organizational mechanisms and
takes over the role that organizations play in
mobilizing and organizing action. It allows for
Role of technology
more personalized communication and
enables individuals to organize
communication (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013;
Johri et al., 2018; Vaast et al., 2017).

Describes a social group’s activities in pursuing a
common interest with guidance from a collective
identity (Olson, 1965; Bennett & Segerberg,
2013).

Technology does not radically change an
action’s dynamics. It does, however, reduce
(financial) costs and resources that organizations
need to disseminate and enforce collective
identities and to motivate users to participate.
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Leong et al., 2018)

In the connective action context, social media “enable forms of work and organization that may otherwise
become difficult, cumbersome, or even impossible in a hierarchical, organizationally bounded ‘silo society’”
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 35). Therefore, social media can galvanize individuals to coordinate and
scale interpersonal networks and, thus, to produce actions free of formal organizational control.
Social media create connective structures through, for example, digital network mechanisms (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2013). Digital network mechanisms, such as hashtags and hyperlinking, have the power to
structure relations between different actors, issues, and events. They reflect connective action’s boundaries
as they constrain and enable actions (Brünker et al., 2020). Hashtags coordinate and direct information
around topics. They bridge networks as they make it possible to share ideas or actions with other individuals
that might be part of different networks but use information provided through the hashtag as well. Through
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hyperlinking, networks can converge with other networks that can be both public and personal in addition
to digital and non-digital (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Digital network mechanisms allow users to start,
sustain, and amplify communication and activity concerning a certain topic. This behavior, in turn, allows for
user archetypes to emerge (Vaast et al., 2017).
In Section 3, we present a case study approach to shed light on user archetypes involved in rumor
spreading, their behavior, and how it contributes to sense-breaking. We then use the connective action as
a theoretical lens to refer to the efforts that users on the microblogging site Twitter make towards correcting
circulating rumors. For an improved understanding and extended perspective, we focus on identifying
sense-breaking mechanisms that one might leverage to counter rumors and the spread of misinformation
during crisis communication on social media.

3
3.1

Research Design
Case Description: The 2018 Chemnitz Riots (Germany)

To answer our research questions, we conducted a case study with a Twitter data set concerning the
Chemnitz riots in Germany 2018 in the German and English languages. We followed a social media
analytics approach and followed four stages: 1) discovery, 2) tracking, 3) preparation, and 4) analysis
(Stieglitz et al., 2018b). For the discovery stage, we turned to Twitter as other researchers have successfully
analyzed it in the crisis communication context (Maddock et al., 2015; Oh et al., 2013; Stieglitz et al., 2017).
Furthermore, we chose it for our study due to its timeliness, relevance for crises, and ability to let users to
take part in a public discourse (Mirbabaie et al., 2020b).
In the early morning of 26 August, 2018, the City of Chemnitz, Germany, a fight erupted between several
people who varied in nationality; three received stab wounds and one, a German national, died from his
wounds. The event triggered several, at times violent, demonstrations against immigrants and refugees.
The situation escalated the following day when right-wing extremists and sympathizers gathered for a rally.
High uncertainty and rumors accompanied the situation (e.g., the victim being killed with 25 stabs of a knife
rather than five) (Bartz & Ginzel, 2018). Other frequently shared rumors about the incident included “not one
but two men were killed through the hands of immigrants in the early morning of August 26 th” or that “the
perpetrators attacked their victim because he wanted to protect a woman from unwanted sexual advances
from the perpetrators” (Stern, 2018). The incident’s politically explosive nature also provided a breeding
ground for propaganda and disinformation. Thus, we found the communication around the demonstrations
in Chemnitz as suitable for studying how rumors and misinformation diffuse throughout social media to
better understand the sense-breaking process on social media. In the tracking stage, we collected tweets
with a publish date between 26 August and 4 September, 2018, using the Twitter Search API. Table 2
presents the selected search keywords and tracked profiles.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the German and English Data Sets
Number of tweets

German

English

Tweets
(original/retweet)

980,867
(167,316/ 813,551)

199,822
(22,703/ 177,119)

41,063

13,414

Keywords in preview

Keywords
(#)c2608

44,198

949

(#)c2708

125,784

10,896

(#)c3008

16,462

654

(#)Chemnitz

903,721

185,242

PolizeiSachsen

20,753

847

cduSachsen

1,632

4

Profiles
@PolizeiSachsen

712

2

@CDUSachsen

32

0
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The hashtags #c2608, #c2708, and #c3008 refer to days when demonstrations took place. The first three
keywords relate to days in August that featured demonstrations. By tapping the Twitter search API with a
self-developed Java crawler and the open-source library Twitter4J, we retrieved all messages (original
tweets, retweets, @mentions) that included at least one of those keywords or hashtags. The Twitter account
@PolizeiSachsen belongs to the police in the state of Saxony, where Chemnitz resides, and
@CDUSachsen belongs to the political party CDU Saxony, the party of Saxony’s prime minister at the time.
Based on the reviewed literature and the importance of EMA and government profiles for rumor correction,
we included these two profiles in the data set. When users embed a link in their tweet, Twitter will present
the linked content as a preview. We also included tweets in the data set when said preview contained one
of the keywords. Figure 1 illustrates an example where the tweet itself did not contain one of the keywords
but the preview did.

Totally unbalanced news from @CNN. Story is much broader and more complex
than ‘extreme right’. What about the German man who was stabbed to death
(24 stabs!!) by rejected asylum seekers, and two other Germans seriously injured?
Not important?
Anti-migrant protests continue for third night in Germany
A few hundred protesters gathered for a nationalist rally in Chemnitz
on Thursday evening, as local officials met with community groups to
discuss…

Figure 1. Example Tweet with Keyword in Preview Text of Linked Article

To better understand the datasets in the preparation stage, we illustrated the total number of tweets,
retweets, and original tweets over time. The overall German communication revolving around the incidents
in Chemnitz differed slightly from the English communication about the events. First, the data set for the
German communication was considerably bigger than the English data set (see Figure 2).
Vertical lines represent the first and last identified tweets for each of four identified rumors: “- -” = number
of knife stabs, “— . —” = number of victims, “…” = travel warning, “—” = victim protected woman.
While both the German and the English Twitter communication showed peaks in tweet volume at similar
points in time, the German communication reached its maximum peak at the end of the second day (27
August) when the demonstrations in Chemnitz escalated, while the English communication reached its
maximum peak several days later in early September, when protesters demonstrated mostly peacefully.
Rumors generally occurred more in the German communication. Since the event unfolded in Germany and,
thus, had higher importance and consequence for German speaking users, they felt a stronger need to
understand the situation. We describe how we identified the rumors in Section 3.2 and, in Sections 3.3 and
3.4, discuss the other steps we took to answer the research questions in the analysis stage. Figure 3 shows
our overall research design.
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Figure 2. Number of Total Tweets, Retweets, and Original Tweets Over Time for German and English Data
Sets

RQ1

RQ2

How do rumors circulate in crisis
communication on social media?

RQ1a

RQ1b

User
archetypes

User
behavior

How does rumor correction affect
sense-breaking?

Discovery
Tracking
Preparation
Analysis
Rumor
identification
semi-automated

Qualitative
Content Analysis
manual

Social Network
Analysis
automated

Figure 3. Research Design Overview
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Rumor Identification

We identified rumors based on background knowledge, media coverage, and fact-checking sites such as
Mimikama1 (Shin et al., 2017). In doing so, we noted keywords and key phrases that referred to the identified
rumor, which we then used to extract postings revolving around rumor spreading from the original data sets
(German and English) to create subsets (Maddock et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2017; Starbird et al., 2018). We
conducted the extraction in an iterative manner using Python2. We pre-processed data via removing special
characters, punctuation, and URLs. We set all text to lowercase. We sorted a tweet into the respective rumor
subset if it contained at least one keyword or key phrase. The same tweet could be included in more than
one subset. We manually checked random tweets in each resulting subset and adjusted keyword lists if
necessary until we found the results satisfactory (Shin et al., 2017). Figure 4 summarizes the process we
followed to extract subsets.

Figure 1. Rumor-extraction Process Illustration

We applied the process to the German and English data sets. We describe the exact rumors in more detail
in Section 4.1. The false positive rate for the rumor-extraction processed ranged between 0.48 to 1.37
percent. However, the rumor that we labeled as travel warning constituted one exception (51.35% false
positive rate) due to the keyword Schweiz (Switzerland), which tweets used in other contexts. However,
without this keyword, we would not have identified nearly half of the relevant tweets. We show the final
keyword list in Appendix A. We discarded rumors when we could identify no suitable keywords and key
phrases or when the subset lacked sufficient size. In the end, we analyzed the top three German rumors
that reached more than 1,000 tweets plus an English rumor and its German equivalent to compare English
and German communication.

3.3

Qualitative Content Analysis

After creating subsets, we analyzed user behavior. Following Maddock et al. (2015), we identified different
behavior types; namely, rumor, speculation, hedge, question, correction, neutral/other and unrelated. We
understood tweets questioning or correcting rumors as sense-breaking messages. Note that unrelated
tweets represent noise and we excluded them from the subsets and further analysis (Maddock et al., 2015).
Compared to Maddock et al. (2015), we coded all remaining tweets rather than reducing the data set to
unique tweets. We coded all remaining tweets since the retweet function constitutes one of Twitter’s central
mechanisms to diffuse messages (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2014). Thus, users will commonly see retweets
that influence their sense-making processes (Mirbabaie & Zapatka, 2017). We conducted the coding
process manually following Mayring’s (2014) steps to deductively assign categories. This method requires

1
2

https://www.mimikama.at/
https://www.python.org/
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one to have already established categories, here behavior types, before beginning the coding process. It
also includes formulating category definitions, anchor examples, and coding rules. As a starting point, we
adopted category definitions from Maddock et al. (2015) and refined them in the categorization process. We
formulated coding rules and added anchor examples during the categorization process. To ensure the
categorization’s quality, we revised the category definitions and coding rules after the category system
seemed to be stable. Any changes to category definitions, coding rules or anchor examples led to our
recoding all tweets. We assorted each tweet to one category only. After the first author initially coded the
tweets, the second author coded them all based on the category definitions, anchor examples, and coding
rules (Mayring, 2014). Inter-rater reliability (Appendix A) showed an acceptable Cohen’s kappa between k
= 0.71 and k = 0.82 (Cohen, 1960). For tweets that they initially coded differently, they subsequently
discussed the tweets and decided on a category (Mayring, 2014). Appendix B shows the final categories
with definitions, anchor examples, and coding rules.

3.4

Social Network Analysis

As a next step, we identified top users that actively participated in communication revolving around the
rumors. To do so, we used social network analysis (SNA) measures. Since the retweet function constitutes
a central and prominent Twitter feature, one can use retweet networks to represent links between
individuals. Here, a link between two individuals represents individual A having retweeted individual B
(Stieglitz et al., 2018b). We used the number of retweets an account achieved (i.e., the in-degree of a node),
which reflects the account’s prestige, to identify the top 10 users. We then manually categorized these top
users into one of the seven distinct archetypes.
By analyzing the top 10 users, we ensured that their degi (i.e., their prestige in the network) exceeded 10
However, due to the English subset’s small size, only the top four users had an in-degree degi > 10. Thus,
one must not overinterpret the results for this subset. We provide more details on the in-degrees of top
users in Appendix C. After identifying the top 10 users for each subset, we used users’ account information
and information obtained through Google searches to manually assign users to archetypes. We identified
these archetypes based on Stieglitz et al. (2017), who identified the aforementioned seven archetypes:
media organizations, governmental organizations, private persons, public persons (journalists), public
persons (celebrities), public persons (politicians) and public persons (other). We created the categories
‘other’ and ‘deleted’ as we could not sort three of the identified top users into any archetype category, and
five top user accounts had been deleted.
To find a satisfactory answer to the second research question (i.e., “How does rumor correction affect sensebreaking?”), we conducted a SNA. For the SNA, we used Gephi v0.9.2, open source software that allows
one to analyze and visualize graphs and networks (Bastian & Heymann, 2009). We calculated centrality
measures that provide information about an individual’s position in the network (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018)
and that several researchers have applied before to identify influential nodes (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018; Park
& Suh, 2013; Stieglitz et al., 2017). We defined betweenness centrality CB(v) by calculating the proportion
of shortest paths that go through node v. Thus, the betweenness centrality reflects the extent to which node
v lies on the shortest path between any other node pair in the network. A node with a high betweenness
centrality has the potential to control communication between different clusters (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018;
Freeman, 1978). Closeness centrality CC(v) reflects the average distance from node v to other nodes in the
network and, thus, its proximity to other nodes. A node with a high closeness centrality has the power to
quickly reach other nodes and is rather independent of other nodes (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018; Freeman,
1978). The Eigenvector centrality CE(v) considers the centralities of nodes that a node v connects to. A
node’s influence increases when it connects to influential nodes (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018).
We analyzed the retweet networks for each subset to obtain information on how successfully top users
spread information-correcting rumors. We used Gephi’s giant component filter to remove all nodes not
connected to the main network. We made an exception when top users resided outside the main network.
Here, we kept the top user and the nodes connected to that user as well. Then, we calculated centralities
to derive information about users’ positions in the networks. To identify community structures in the
networks, we identified network partitions. In a partition, nodes densely connect to one another, while nodes
in different partitions sparsely connect to one another (Blondel et al., 2008). We applied modularity, which
“measures the density of links inside communities as compared to links between communities” (Blondel et
al., 2008, p. 2), to identify partitions.

Volume 14

Issue 2

161

4

Rumor Correction in Social Media Crisis Communication: A Case of Connective Sense-breaking

Results

4.1

Identified Rumors

Based on background knowledge about the events and research (e.g., in fact-checking sites), we identified
and extracted four rumors with relevant clout that involved misinformation from the German data set. We
labeled the identified rumors as follows.
•

Number of victims: refers to two people dying due to the attack in the early morning on 26 August

•

Number of knife stabs: states that the victim received 25 stabs with a knife rather than five

•

Victim protected a woman: refers to misinformation about how the perpetrators attacked their
victim because he wanted to protect a woman from unwanted sexual advances from the
perpetrators

•

Travel warning: refers to misinformation about travel warnings for Germany, especially about a
travel warning from Switzerland that was actually a travel note

The rumor victim protected a woman was the only rumor to receive attention in English communication
(victim protected a woman (ENG)). We show tweet examples for each rumor in Appendix A.

4.2

Identified Behavior

We present descriptive statistics of the analyzed rumors and behavior types in Table 3. We excluded
unrelated tweets from all analyses, including the results shown in Table 3. Users exhibited rumor and
correction (sense-breaking message) behaviors the most frequently.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the German and English Data Sets
Total

Rumor

Speculation

Hedge

Correction

Question

Neutral/ other

61
(19/42)

4
(4/0)

29
(9/20)

601
(37/564)

207
(11/196)

131
(20/111)

41
(12/29)

0
(0/0)

708
(91/617)

0
(0/0)

0
(0/0)

0
(0/0)

1
(1/0)

Number of knife stabs
1,786
(264/1,522)

1,690
(230/1,460)

1
(1/0)

1
(1/0)
Number of victims

1,514
(134/1,380)

573
(63/508)

2
(2/0)

0
(0/0)
Travel warning

1,369
(339/1,030)

494
(189/305)

124
(45/79)

2
(2/0)

Victim protected a woman (GER)
597
(77/520)

491 (64/427)

4
(4/0)

1
(1/0)

101
(8/93)

Victim protected a woman (ENG)
209
(43/166)

107
(27/80)

61
(10/51)

0
(0/0)

40
(5/35)

However, we found an immense difference in their tweet volume: on average, 60.40 percent of the tweets
in the subsets were rumor tweets and 16.43 percent were correction tweets. We show rumor and correction
tweet examples in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
Table 4. Rumor Tweet Example
“Chemnitz perpetrator: asylum seeker with criminal record, wrote on FB: I will kill you https://..”
Table 5. Correction Tweet Example
“The Facebook translation of the alleged perpetrator in #Chemnitz is pure nonsense. Plainly translated wrongly. The
correct translation is: “I miss you, my friends.” https://...”

Except for number of victims and travel warning, users exhibited the rumor behavior type the most
frequently. Only for number of victims did correction tweets achieve a slightly higher volume than rumor
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tweets. The behavior types speculation, hedge, and question appeared far less frequently than rumor
tweets. We show example speculation, hedge, and question tweets in Table 6.
Table 6. Speculation, Hedge, and Question Tweet Examples
Speculation tweet example
“Supposedly uncovered! The one performing the Hitler salute in #Chemnitz is allegedly called T***** V***** and
works as a free journalist for SZ, Spiegel, Stern und Zeit. He was provoking with calls like “Our theme is to kill” and
similar slogans”
Hedge tweet example
“It is not proven whether a German woman was assaulted by foreign demonstrators in Chemnitz. However, the
opposite is not proven either. I do not understand why the media say that it is not proven. It’s a biased conciliation.”
Question tweet example
“#chemnitz there are rumors about two victims during the folj festival. One of the severely injured allegedly died as
well. Can the Police confirm this or is there a gagging order. I was not able to find verified sources.”

Travel warning emerged as one exception. Here, we found nearly three times more speculation tweets than
correction tweets (though still lower in number than rumors). Users exhibited neutral/other tweets as the
most common behavior exhibited in this communication. We show example neutral/other tweets in Table 7.
Table 7. Neutral/Other Tweet Example
“22.08.2017 Manchester terrorist attack, 3 days later people commemorate the 22 victims and the crowd is singing
“Don’t look back in anger”. 25.09.2018 #Chemnitz knife attack 1 victim, 3 days later the crowd is chivvying and calls
for hunting down immigrants #coldland #AfDtakeseffect”

To understand how behavior developed over time, we illustrate the behavior types’ frequency over the datacollection period. Communication about the rumors number of victims and victim protected a woman (GER)
basically disappeared after three days (Figure 5).

Figure 5. “Number of Victims” and “Victim Protected Woman (GER)” Rumors over Time (Tweets per Day)

Note that the small increase in neutral/other tweets in September for number of victims emerged due to a
political talk show and a user complaining about how it depicted the events. The tweet did not support the
misinformation. The rumors number of knife stabs, travel warning and victim protected a woman (ENG)
remained active during the whole period that the data covered (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. “Number of Knife Stabs”, “Victim Protected Woman (ENG), and “Travel Warning” Rumors over
Time (Tweets per Day)

For number of knife stabs, we found two peaks in rumor behavior. The communication concerning the
number of victims peaked on 27 August. On the first day (26 August), correction tweets achieved a higher
tweet volume than rumor tweets. The misinformation disappeared after its peak.
The misinformation about travel warnings achieved its highest peak in volume several days after the crime
(see Figure 6). The smaller peak in the first days related to misinformation in a travel warning that Canada
issued in 2015. These tweets did not state that Canada issued a new travel warning; rather, they implied
that such a travel warning would be appropriate given the demonstrations. Speculation tweets, which
peaked along with neutral/other tweets in the first days after the incident, outright called for travel warnings
or blamed the Minister President of Saxony for not taking action to prevent travel warnings. These
speculations and calls for travel warnings became more concrete when Switzerland updated its travel notes
on 28 August, 2018, which users often misunderstood as a travel warning and contributed to the rumor
peak. The communication around travel also triggered the large peak of neutral/other tweets that mainly
concerned ambiguous tweets informing others about the update without explicitly referring to it as a warning
but also without making its nature clear as a travel note. Concerning the German communication about the
victim protecting a woman, we found a high number of rumor tweets on the first day (26 August, 2018),
which rapidly decreased over the following two days. Correction peaked on the second day but never
surpassed rumor behavior. The misinformation basically disappeared afterwards.
In the English communication revolving around this misinformation, rumor behavior peaked on the first day
as well, but the communication did not disappear as fast as in the German communication. Instead, rumor
behavior peaked twice, and we observed a peak in speculation behavior as well as in several correction
peaks.

Volume 14

Paper 3

Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction

4.3

164

Archetype Behavior

For the number of knife stabs, all top users exhibited rumor behavior. Two users additionally showed
question and neutral behavior. Users can exhibit more than one behavior when they released several
original tweets or additionally engaged in retweeting. Public persons (politicians) played an important role
in this rumor-spreading network. We assorted four users (among the 10) to this archetype, including the top
user, a member of “Die Rechte” (The Right). The remaining three were Alternative für Deutschland
(Alternative for Germany) members. One can describe both political parties as right-wing parties (Arzheimer,
2015; Berbuir et al., 2015; Puls, 2015). A frequently retweeted tweet by the top user related to the first peak
in rumor behavior (see Figure 6). We attributed the second peak in early September to private person A.
This individual released a tweet that included a picture depicting smiling social democrats during a
demonstration that took place the day before. For number of victims, top user behavior exhibited more
diversity and included the behavior types rumor, correction, question and neutral. Still, users exhibited the
behavior rumor behavior type the most frequently. The top user in this subset was governmental
organization. The police used this account to actively correct the misinformation. The account published a
general correction tweet that directly addressed the misinformation and contributed strongly to the correction
peak visible in Figure 6. Apart from this tweet, the account also issued tweets addressing certain users
including public person B (a politician). Apart from the mentioned politician, we found two other politicians,
both right-wing politicians, among the top 10 users: one supported the misinformation, while the other
tweeting neutrally. The only other user who actively corrected the misinformation was a public person
(journalist A).
In the travel warning category, we found three German media organizations among the top 10 users.
Additionally, we identified a politician in a left-wing party and a journalist. Half of the top users showed
neutral behavior as they tweeted information about the travel note that Switzerland made without explicitly
supporting the rumor about a travel warning but also without explicitly labeling it as a “travel note”. Most
users, however, supported the misinformation (mostly rumors). We could not attribute the rumor peak on
the 31 August (see Figure 6) to one of the top 10 users alone, but it included tweets. Roughly one third of
the tweets making up this peak were original tweets.
For the German rumor about the victim protecting a woman from sexual assault, most users exhibited the
rumor behavior type. Only one user corrected the misinformation (other A)). We coded the user, a private
organization fighting against racism, as “other”. We also assorted a second user, an official account by a
right-wing political party, to the other category (other B). The top user in this subset had already deleted
their profile; thus, we could derive no implication about the user’s archetype. All users supporting the
misinformation issued a tweet on the 27 August and, thus, contributed to the peak in rumor behavior.
Compared to the German communication, we identified the three top users in the English communication
as media organizations. Two corrected the misinformation (media organizations E and F), while one
supported it with speculations (media organization D). It published a tweet stating that misinformation about
a man being killed while trying to protect a woman from sexual assault triggered demonstrations in Germany.
While the linked article declared the misinformation as false, the tweet itself did not comment on the
misinformation’s veracity and, thus, contributed to speculation and was responsible for the peak in
speculation behavior (see Figure 5). We attributed correction peaks to the top users correcting the
misinformation. We attributed the first peak in rumor behavior to the top user, a Spanish profile that appeared
as a news site and issued tweets in Spanish and English. The user provided no information sources in its
tweets and neither a homepage nor company details. Thus, we coded the account as other. We show the
top 10 users, their archetypes, behaviors, and centrality measures in Appendix C3.

3

We do not reveal user names due to privacy concerns.
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Archetype Positions in the Network

Generally, the top users had low closeness and betweenness centralities, which indicates that those users
did not act as information brokers and did not have the power to quickly and independently spread
information (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018; Freeman, 1978). For the number of knife stabs, four top users
appeared among the users with the highest betweenness centrality in the whole subset with private person
F achieving the highest betweenness centrality among them (and the second highest in the subset). The
other three top users ranked by in-degree who were among the users with the highest betweenness
centrality also achieved a high closeness centrality. With few exceptions, top users by in-degree achieved
the highest Eigenvector centrality. We summarize the communication about the “number of knife stabs” in
Table 8.
Table 8. Top Users (In-degree) of “Number of Knife Stabs” Rumor Spreading
Top

Archetype

Behavior

degi

CB

CC

vE

Number of knife stabs
1

public person (politician) (A)

Rumor

447

0

0

1

2

private person (A)

Rumor

252

0

0

0.58

3

public person (politician) (B)

Rumor

102

0

0

0.26

4

private person (B)

Rumor

76

68.5

1

0.17

5

private person (C)

Rumor

58

57.0

1

0.13

6

private person (D)

Rumor

40

0

0

0.09

7

private person (E)

Rumor, question

32

0

0

0.08

8

public person (politician) (C)

Rumor

30

0

0

0.07

9

private person (F)

Rumor

29

111.5

0.57

0.07

10

public person (politician) (D)

Rumor,
neutral/other

26

25.0

1

0.06

deg. = degree; CB = betweenness centrality; CC = closeness centrality; vE = eigenvector centrality

We show tables for each top user sample of the other rumor-spreading networks in Appendix C. The
visualization of retweet networks (Figure 7) illustrates that, for three out of the five retweet networks, top
users belonged to disconnected parts of the network.
For victim protected a woman (GER), all top users exhibiting the rumor behavior belonged to the main part
of the network, while the only top user correcting the misinformation (other (A)) belonged to the smaller
disconnected part. For the travel warning, two top users supporting the misinformation (deleted B), private
person J) belonged to the disconnected part of the network. For victim protecting a woman (ENG), only two
of the top users had a connection to each other (other C) and private person U). We show the centrality
measures for top users in Appendix C.
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Abbreviations:
Media = media organizations
Gov. org. = governmental organizations
Private = private persons
Journalist = public persons (journalists)
Politician = public persons (politicians)

Number of victims

Number of knife stabs

Victim protected woman (GER)

Travel warning

Victim protected woman (ENG)

Figure 7. Retweet Networks and Modularity Classes (Indicated by Colors)
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Discussion
Influential Archetypes and User Behavior in Rumor Spreading (RQ1)

In most rumors that we analyzed, messages supporting misinformation (rumors) prevailed while correction
efforts appeared less successful based on tweet volume. Furthermore, the number of tweets that corrected
rumors surpassed tweets that supported rumors only after the latter’s volume noticeably decreased.
Sometimes, corrections did not surpass tweets supporting rumors at all. This finding concurs with earlier
findings (Andrews et al., 2016; Maddock et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2017). Nevertheless, for number of victims
and victim protected a woman (GER), communication ceased three days after the misinformation’s
emerged. For number of victims, we can attribute this finding to a successful original tweet from a
responsible EMA (a police account) that led to a peak in correction tweets. This result implies that EMA can
successfully correct misinformation and play an important role in doing so (Andrews et al., 2016). Here, the
EMA functioned as an active sense-breaker that explicitly declared the information as false (sense-breaking
message). The communication around this rumor also supported the notion of a self-correcting crowd (Jong
& Dückers, 2016) as users perceived the information as false and actively engaged in correcting it. However,
this mechanism appeared infrequently. For victim protected a woman (GER), the only other rumor where
communication ceased quickly, correction volume distinctively paled in volume to supporting behavior.
Here, external influences probably led to the disintegrating the misinformation, such as when a big German
newspaper first supported the misinformation in an article before it later (on 26 August, 2018) deleted
mentions about the sexual assault.
Only the English communication supported the notion of rumor spreading peaking multiple times compared
to non-rumor communication (Kwon et al., 2013). Furthermore, we found that English communication
prominently exhibited speculation behavior. The media organization that referenced the rumor in its tweet
triggered speculation and resolved it in in the linked article. Presenting information this way is problematic
as users seldom click on linked news content and, thus, likely form their opinions based on previews
(Anspach & Carlson, 2018). Even though we found a low tweet volume for the English communication
concerned with rumors, results indicate that a tweet’s wording can play an important role in misleading and,
thus, in diffusing information.
Rumors peaking in the communication concerned with the travel warning related to the Swiss travel note,
which might have roots in individuals’ pre-existing cognitive frameworks that influence which cues they
notice and how they bracket them in the sense-making process (Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). As
communication occurred before the actual travel note appeared, individuals perceived travel warnings as
an appropriate reaction to ongoing demonstrations. Thus, they might have interpreted the travel note as an
explicit warning that aligned with their prior beliefs (Kumar & Geethakumari, 2014).
Rumor behavior dominated communication, which we can see based on the fact that prestigious users
exhibited it more than any other behavior. In particular, private persons commonly contribute to spreading
rumors but seldom corrected them. Generally, private individuals contributing to spreading misinformation
concurs with notions about it being a natural part of the sense-making process (Oh et al., 2013). Additionally,
users might have struggled to identify rumors (Kumar & Geethakumari, 2014) or might have been uncertain
about a tweet’s veracity. Alternatively, users might not have felt responsible for supporting rumors or did not
see it as their responsibility to correct the information (Arif et al., 2017). Apart from private persons, rightwing politicians strongly contributed to spreading rumors as well. As for why other users frequently shared
their tweets, one could argue that users put their trust in the information source (here, the political actors)
and, thus, retweeted the information (Arif et al., 2017).
Media organizations participated in spreading rumors less frequently than private persons and politicians.
All identified media organizations participated in communication related to the travel warnings. Conversely,
we found no media organization among the top users in the communication directly concerned with the
crime-related rumors. We did not expect this finding since research has identified media organizations as
important sense-breakers in crisis communication (Stieglitz et al., 2017). Media organizations and
journalists participated in communication by supporting rumors, correcting them, or referring to them
neutrally. No media organization or journalist participating in spreading rumors subsequently corrected them
or vice versa. We found only two users, a politician and a private person, who supported and questioned a
rumor in the analyzed communication. This finding concurs with earlier findings about individuals but also
media organizations and journalists in that they typically contribute to communication by either supporting
rumors or by denying them (Starbird et al., 2018).
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The Impact of Rumor Correction on Sense-breaking (RQ2)

The SNA revealed that correction tweets had a hard time traveling through the respective rumor networks.
Some observed networks were even completely disconnected. For the German and English communication
about the victim having protected a woman from sexual assault, this disconnection proved especially
problematic. For the German communication, the only top user correcting the misinformation resided at the
center of a disconnected subnetwork, while all other top users, who uniformly supported the information,
formed the main network. This finding raises the question of whether these users encountered corrective
information via Twitter. For the English rumor story, the SNA revealed that the communication took place in
several disconnected subnetworks. Only two top users were connected to each other, while the other top
users formed their own disconnected networks. This finding might be related to the network’s small size.
The travel warning network exhibited a disconnected structure as well. Here, a subnetwork formed around
two top users who supported the rumor. On the other hand, the main network comprised top users
supporting the rumor, correcting it, or referring to it neutrally. However, top users correcting and top users
supporting the rumor resided in different communities as modularity indicated (Blondel et al., 2008). Thus,
the overall sparse number of corrections did not seem to reach the affected users and, thus, could not
effectively quell rumors.
For the network concerned with number of knife stabs, all top users belonged to one connected network.
All top users supported the rumor and, thus, thwarted efforts to diffuse sense-breaking messages. Here,
communication seemed to have occurred in a biased closed-off network where sense-breaking messages
lacked relevance. In this network, four of the top users by in-degree were also among the top ten users with
the highest betweenness centrality. Thus, these users reached numerous nodes and frequently lay on the
shortest paths between two other users. Removing these nodes would impact the information flow
(Freeman, 1978). Three of the users also had central positions in the network due to their high closeness
centralities (CC=1). Thus, these users received information quickly (Boulet & Lebraty, 2018) and were rather
independent of others as they relied on fewer users to pass information through the network (Freeman,
1978). This finding contrasts with the other examined rumor networks where top users by in-degree typically
had closeness and betweenness centralities of CC=0 and CB=0. Thus, in most cases, top users influenced
communication through a high number of retweets but did not take on central positions in the network in
terms of betweenness or closeness. Users who did take on central positions (private persons and one rightwing politician) supported rumors.
Communities or disconnected subnetworks in which top users either participate in correcting or supporting
rumors but barely both hint at echo chambers (Garrett, 2017; Shin et al., 2017). In echo chambers, most
information that individuals encounter concurs with their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs. Thus, individuals
will feel that others widely share and adopt their attitudes and beliefs. As a result, they become more resilient
to contradicting information even when they base their beliefs on unverified information (Lewandowsky et
al., 2017). From a sense-making perspective, the notion of resilient beliefs concurs with the assumption that
sense-making deals with plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick et al., 2005). One may understand sensebreaking messages as criticism to constructed meaning. If constructed meaning exhibits sufficient resilience
to such criticism, users deem sense-breaking messages irrelevant and neither integrate them into their
meaning construction nor share them (Weick et al., 2005).
In contrast to the other rumor spreading we describe, all top users for the communication concerning the
number of victims belonged to a connected network. Only in this network did sense-breaking messages
seem to be successful with an official police account playing a central role. When looking at the SNA results,
however, we found that top users correcting the misinformation and top users supporting it again belonged
to different communities. Thus, most users who retweeted the two top users correcting the information did
not engage in spreading the misinformation. In the same manner, users who did retweet top users
supporting the misinformation barely retweeted users correcting it. Nevertheless, rumor spreading ceased
quickly, which implies that users became aware of sense-breaking messages and integrated them into their
sense-making process but did not support efforts to re-establish an accurate information space. Indeed,
research has found users have a lower likelihood to engage with content via liking and commenting that
contradicts their worldview than content that concurs with it (Stroud, Muddiman, & Scacco, 2017; Zollo et
al., 2017).
In the present case study, rumors mainly badmouthed refugees and immigrants and depicted them as
violent and dangerous. We can describe such content as propaganda as it to supports a strong political
view on immigrants and refugees (Tandoc et al., 2018). However, we did not analyze user’s intention since
it fell beyond our scope here. Thus, we remain on the rumor analysis level as opposed to classifying them
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as disinformation or fake news. Nevertheless, the identified rumors may have fueled racist prejudice as
social media messages spread more rapidly and more broadly compared to prejudiced messages via private
channels. As a consequence, polarized groups or reduced social trust may have occurred, and the rumors
may have possibly even resulted in offline hate crimes (Dutta et al., 2018) (e.g., during the demonstrations
that took place in Chemnitz). Therefore, we can see the need to restore an accurate information space and
to bridge communities and disconnected networks.

5.3

Theoretical Implications

Our findings add to the literature as they stress the problematic point that rumors gain significant attention
while rumor corrections largely do not. Rumors can threaten the sense-making process and possibly human
lives when people construct meaning based on misinformation, which supports the need to successfully
diffuse rumor corrections. Consequently, rumors can be a potentially harmful influence on decision-making
and action as Starbird et al. (2018) have pointed out. Our study adds to this understanding that prejudices
and xenophobia can fuel rumors in a context that already features significant uncertainty and anxiety.
Additionally, our findings show that rumors that strengthen differences in political attitudes might impede
connective action.
Moreover, our research complements findings on users’ lack of motivation to participate in rumor corrections
(Arif et al., 2017). We found EMA as the social media user archetype with the highest potential to keep the
information space clean or to restore it. In this way, the EMA assumes a “sense-breaker” role, which is
critical for connective action to create new meaning among users.
Due to the observed evidence about successful sense-breaking via rumor correction in the rumor networks
that involved the EMA and the observations from the communication with unsuccessful rumor correction,
we propose a notion we label “connective sense-breaking”. We argue that this concept represents a useful
contribution to the body of knowledge as it shows how connective action, in this case through rumor
correction, can lead to sense-breaking and, eventually, information consensus. Figure 8 illustrates the
concept’s composition.

Sense-making
Communication
Channel(s),

Domain
e.g. Crisis Communication

e.g. Twitter
sharing information
seeking information
sharing opinions
sharing thoughts

•
•
•
•

Domain-specific
characteristics

Phenomenon:
e.g. rumours

behaviour

behaviour

e.g.

•
•
•

uncertainty (Stieglitz et al.
2018)
ambiguity (Runyan 2016)
anxiety (Oh et al. 2013)

private

private

politicians

politicians

journalists

journalists
deleted

Archetypes

media

other

other

governmental
organisations

media

Supporting Cues

Correcting Cues

New constructed
meaning
through ‘connective
sense-breaking’
Consensus of
information as basis
of decision making

Connective action
Figure 8. Connective Sense-breaking in Social Media Crisis Communication

The concept shows that certain user archetypes differ in the way they contribute to supporting (supporting
cues) and correcting (correcting cues) meaning. Information consensus (i.e., a mutual and accurate view of
the events achieved through connective sense-breaking) requires specific archetypes’ contributions and
inherent characteristics. For instance, for successful connective sense-breaking, archetypes with high
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authority (e.g., EMA, politicians) should connect with archetypes holding characteristics such as popularity
or a unique position in a network (e.g., journalists, private persons). Table 9 summarizes the way in which
we conceptualize connective sense-breaking in reference to rumor spreading on social media.
Table 9. Summary of the Connective Sense-breaking Concept
Dimension

Definition

Description
Connective sense-breaking refers to social media users’ connective actions that focus on
constructing in a self-governed manner new meaning in an ambiguous communication
environment without organizational control (e.g., rumor spreading on social media).
To achieve information consensus, social media user archetypes disseminate rumorsupporting cues and correction cues via their sharing behavior. This sharing behavior and its
impact on sense-breaking differ among archetypes.

Connective sense-breaking does not require a collective identity. Connective sense-breaking
can emerge from expedient interplay between archetypes and their behavior regardless of
Identity of participants
individual objectives. However, authoritative users with the distinct goal to achieve connective
sense-breaking facilitate the process.
Action Frames

Connective sense-breaking benefits from personal action frames that communicate sensebreaking as a common goal and encourage users to participate it.

In the connective sense-breaking process, organizations and individuals have equal
opportunities to impact the meaning construction. However, certain archetypes tend to have
Role of organizations more aprioristic trust (or reach) such as EMA (or influencers). Connective sense-breaking
takes place as a form of self-motivated coproduction between individual and organizational
archetypes without visible external incentives.
Role of technology

Connective sense-breaking is subject to little or no organizational control. Instead, users
employ digital network mechanisms such as hashtags and retweets to structure
communication.

This theoretical concept supports the argument that the logic of connective action affects rumor spreading
during crisis communication. One can argue that rumor-spreading networks emerge spontaneously as a
reaction to events that trigger crises. Individuals feel the need to bridge knowledge gaps and turn to social
media (e.g., Twitter). Different user archetypes use digital network mechanisms, such as creating or
forwarding hashtags and retweets, to coordinate communication, which underlines the role that social media
plays as a technological agent for connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Moreover, the connective
sense-breaking concept follows the argument that social media has an integral role in the logic of connective
action. Social media relegates organizational archetypes such as political parties, governmental
organizations (including EMA), or media organizations to the same level of potential influence compared to
individual or private user archetypes because each social media user has access to the same digital network
mechanisms and, therefore, the same ability to impact connective sense-breaking. Rumor spreading
appears to be largely free of organizational control. Instead, user archetypes draw on social media’s network
mechanisms and its capability to organize and influence communication.
The connective sense-breaking notion enriches the theory of connective action. Extant scholarship that has
explored the cognitive phenomena of meaning creation, especially in the crisis communication domain, has
relied on sense-making theory dimensions that researchers developed against a collective action backdrop
(i.e., collective sense-making) (Suthers, 2006; Mirababie & Marx, 2019). However, as we show in this study,
one can better understand phenomena occurring on and around self-organizing information systems, such
as rumor spreading, with connective action. Hence, by turning to the sense-breaking mechanism in sensemaking theory and using it to extend what we know about connective action, we argue that the connective
sense-breaking notion provides a valuable addition to theory since it incorporates involved user archetypes
and their behavior.
It describes a form of self-motivated action that focuses on creating new meaning by expediently combining
the characteristics of communication archetypes and the mechanisms of self-governed information systems
such as social media. Additionally, personal expressions that users share with others reflect connective
sense-breaking. Connective sense-breaking constitutes a way for individuals to express themselves in
situations that involve contradictory meaning and helps them to gain recognition or self-validation (Bennett
& Segerberg, 2013). Therefore, factors that adversely affect connective sense-breaking include the fear of
losing recognition and a lack of motivation or unawareness. We also propose density (i.e., the
connectedness of network structures) as another moderating factor. Sparsely connected networks, which
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possibly result from missing characteristic user types and their behavior, make it difficult for connective
sense-breaking to unfold.

5.4

Implications for Practice and IS Research

In this section, we derive implications for best practices that will help to control rumors in crisis
communication on social media. Our results indicate that rumors have an impact on sense-breaking and
connective action as rumors gain significant attention while corrections largely do not.
In order to encourage users to contribute to connective sense-breaking, EMA should communicate their
goals openly and incentivize individuals for participation (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Moreover, EMA
should use more personal action frames. That is, EMA could frame the idea of participating in rumor
correction as easy to personalize ideas that do not require strong persuasion, reasoning, or reframing. EMA
could introduce these personalized action frames in the form of hashtags to coordinate and direct
information around topics. Ideally, using hashtags would counter possible echo chambers by bridging
networks where users engage in either correcting or supporting rumors. As a successful example in which
an EMA used a hashtag in this way, we note the #mythbuster hashtag that allowed Queensland police to
effectively counter misinformation during the Queensland floods (Eustace & Alam, 2012). Additionally, to
make more users aware of rumors, EMA should also provide clues on how to identify unverified rumors
(e.g., that stem from unambiguous sources) (Oh et al., 2013). Ideally, communicating corrections as a goal,
introducing personal action frames, and educating users on how to identify trusted sources will lead to a
higher engagement in connective sense-breaking.
The analysis we conducted contributes to IS research by providing further insight into how rumors and their
corrections diffuse through self-organizing information systems such as social media. Our results indicate
that SNA metrics as IS research commonly uses them might contribute little to identifying archetypes that
engage in sense-breaking. We seldom found users who corrected or questioned rumors among prestigious
users and did not have high betweenness or closeness centralities. In most cases, they had a limited impact
based on the retweet networks. Thus, IS research will benefit from identifying concrete (successful) sensebreaking user characteristics that one could use to detect these users in real time. Upon identifying sensebreaking users, EMA could approach these users with corrective information in order to effectively contribute
to connective sense-breaking.

6

Conclusion

In this study, we examine rumor spreading on Twitter in the context of the 2018 Chemnitz riots. We use
connective action and sense-breaking as lenses to understand this phenomenon’s underlying mechanisms.
We found that we could describe the impact that spontaneous networks that organizations primarily
organized via using Twitter and its digital network mechanisms had on rumor spreading with a concept that
we call connective sense-breaking.
In the given case, private persons and politicians impacted rumor spreading by supporting rumors. Yet, they
did not control communication. EMA act as a sense-breaking archetype due to their high perceived authority
and can significantly contribute to correcting rumors. The idea of connective sense-breaking conveys that
archetypes (e.g., a single EMA and a lot of private individuals) combine their efforts (e.g., rumor correction)
to create new and purposeful meaning in an expedient manner.
This study has several limitations. First, we conducted a case study in the context of a political crisis. Thus,
in collecting data, we might have underrepresented certain actors and overrepresented others due to search
keywords we used. We might have missed relevant data if a tweet did not contain one of the chosen
keywords. Furthermore, the identified data involving rumor spreading lacked volume compared to the overall
communication. While rumor spreading communication might naturally have such a composition, the
comparably small volume might also relate to the extraction method we used. Extracting rumors by using
keywords and key phrases depends on whether users employ these keywords and phrases, which can
mean one excludes relevant tweets. As an alternative to using a keyword-based approach, we could have
manually extracted tweets related to rumors. However, we could not feasibly have done so. Future research
should also focus on how to automatically identify sense-breaking users in real time. As the applied SNA
measures did not provide clear sense-breaking user characteristics, IS research might benefit from a
content analysis of tweets that sense-breaking users publish to identify typical n-grams. For better
generalizability, future research may also consider a wider range of crises.
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Additionally, to successfully motivate users to participate in connective sense-breaking, one might analyze
what makes personal action frames successful (and unsuccessful). Here, research could focus on the
sentiment of personal action frames, the impact of images, and textual features such as text length. Indeed,
researchers have found all these factors to influence the extent to which information diffuses on social media
(Kuiken et al., 2017; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2014; Strekalova & Krieger, 2017), and they might contribute
to whether personal action frames concerned with keeping the information space accurate diffuse
successfully.
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Appendix A: Rumor Denotation (Cohen’s Kappa), Descriptions, Example
Tweets, Keywords and Phrases Used to Extract Rumors
Table A1. Rumor Denotation (Cohen’s Kappa), Descriptions, Example Tweets (URLs Shortened,
Annotations in Brackets) and Keywords and Key Phrases
Number of knife stabs (k = 0.82)
Description: users wrongly claimed that the victim was killed with 25 knife stabs (or a similarly exaggerated
number) rather than five.
Example rumor (translation): Widerlich! In #Chemnitz wird ein Deutscher mit 25 Messerstichen
abgeschlachtet, aber OB Barbara Ludwig ist nur "entsetzt" Ã¼ber die Demonstranten, die sich nicht abstechen
lassen wollen. #c2608 https://...
(Disgusting! In #Chemnitz a German is slaughtered with 25 stabs of a knife, but mayor Barbara Ludwig is
“shocked” only about the demonstrators, that do not want to be slaughtered. #c2608 https://...)
Example Correction (translation): Der Tote von #Chemnitz kann aufatmen. Er wurde nur mit 5
Messerstichen getÃ¶tet. Das wird ihn post mortem freuen. WTF?!? https://...
(The victim of #Chemnitz can breathe a sigh of relief. He was killed with five stabs of a knife only. He will be
happy about that post mortem. WITF?!? https://...)
Keywords: 25 messerstiche, 24 messerstiche, 23 messerstiche, 22 messerstiche, 21 messerstiche, 20
messerstiche, mehr als 20 messerstiche, 26 messerstiche, 27 messerstiche, 28 messerstiche, 29
messerstiche, 5 messerstiche, fünf messerstiche
Number of victims (k = 0.81)
Description: Users wrongly claimed that a second victim died because of the attack.
Example rumor (translation): Zwei Todesopfer, ein Schwerverletzter - aber die #SPD-OB von #Chemnitz hat
Angst, dass ihr Stadtfest gestÃ¶rt werden kÃ¶nnte. Wer wÃ¤hlt solche Leute und diese Partei? https://...
(Two deaths, one severly injured – but the #SPD-OB of #Chemnitz is afraid, that their city festival could be
disturbed. Who is voting for people like that and this party? https://...)
Example correction (translation): Klarstellung! Entgegen anderslautender GerÃ¼chte gibt es nach dem
Zwischenfall in #Chemnitz keinen zweiten Todesfall. Zum gestrigen Einsatzverlauf werden wir uns im Laufe
des Tages Ã¤uÃŸern. #C2608 #c2708 (Correction! Contrary to rumors there is not a second death after the
incident in #Chemnitz. We will provide more information about yesterday’s police operation over the course of
the day. #C2608 #c2708)
Keywords: zwei todesopfer, 2 todesopfer, zwei todesfälle, 2 todesfälle, zwei tote, 2 tote, zweiten todesfall,
zwei opfer, 2 opfer, zweites todesopfer, zweiter toter, 2 toter, zweiter todesfall, 2 todesfall, zwei menschen
ermordet, 2 menschen ermordet, zwei menschen getötet, 2 menschen getötet, ein mann ermordet, 1 mann
ermordet, ein mann getötet, 1 mann getötet
Travel warning (k = 0.71)
Description: Users wrongly claimed that other countries had issued travel warnings. This misinformation was
fueled by Switzerland’s updated travel notes for Germany. The update was mistaken as an acute travel
warning or was ambiguously shared without declaring it as a warning but also without highlighting that it is an
updated travel note. Furthermore, an old rumor about Canada having issued a travel warning for Germany in
2015 re-emerged.
Example rumor (translation): Und das nennt sich Bundes-PrÃ¤sident! Der fÃ¼r die Linken Werbung macht,
die damals vom Verfassungsschutz Beobachtet wurden sind ! Kein Wunder das so viele LÃ¤nder
Reisewarnungen Aussprechen! Bei so welchen Politiker wÃ¼rde ich auch warnen! #Chemnitz #AfD #Europa
#Merkel #SPD #CDU https://...
(And he calls himself Federal President! He, who advertises Die Linke [left-wing party], that used to be
observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution! Not surprising that many countries issue
travel warnings! I would issue warnings to for politicians like that! #Chemnitz #AfD #Europa #Merkel #SPD
#CDU https:/…)
Example correction (translation): Chemnitz: Falschmeldung Ã¼ber offizielle Reisewarnung https://...
#faktenfinder #Chemnitz #Reisewarnung #Fake
(Chemnitz: False report about official travel warning https://... #faktenfinder #Chemnitz #Reisewarnung [travel
warning] #Fake)
Keywords: reisewarnung, schweiz
Victim protected woman (GER) (k = 0.82)
Description: Users falsely claimed that the perpetrators sexual assaulted a woman and that the victim died
when trying to help her.
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Example rumor (translation): Ein angeblich behindertes Journalistenteam wird zu StaatsaffÃ¤re
aufgeblasen. Dass in #Chemnitz zwei MÃ¤nner abgestochen wurden, einer davon tÃ¶dlich, weil sie einer
bedrÃ¤ngten Frau helfen wollten, interessiert kein Schwein. Deutsche ZustÃ¤nde 2018. #Sachsen (An
allegedly retarded team of journalists is turned into an affair of state. That two men were stabbed in
#Chemnitz, one deadly, because they wanted to protect an assaulted woman, is not of interest to anyone.
German state of things 2018. #Sachsen)
Example correction (translation)*: Einen grossen Teil der Verantwortung fÃ¼r die Scheisse, die heute in
#Chemnitz abging und morgen abgehen wird, hat Ã¼brigens das Scheissblatt @XX von @XX, das immer
noch in allen Headlines wissentlich lÃ¼gt, es wÃ¤re eine Frau belÃ¤stigt worden. #XX #c2608 #c2708
#FCKXX
(The abhorrent newspaper @XX by @XX is largely responsible for the shit that happened today in #Chemnitz
and that will happen tomorrow, it is still knowingly lying in headlines about a woman allegedly being assaulted.
#XX #c2608 #c2708 #FCKXX )
*censored to maintain anonymity
Keywords: couragierter junger mann, frau verteidigen, frau beschützen, frau retten, vor einer vergewaltigung
schützen, vor einer vergewaltigung beschützen, vor vergewaltigung schützen, vor vergewaltigung schützen,
schutz einer deutschen frau, frau helfen, frau belästigt, vergewaltigung verhindern, vergewaltigung verhindert
Victim protected woman (ENG) (k = 0.81)
Description: See victim protected woman (GER).
Example rumor: #Chemnitz Thousands protest after a German dies trying to protect a woman -Suspects
according to police: Iraqi 22 & Syrian 23 -"Wir sind das Volk" [We are the people] -Big Media frames protestors
as "Nazis" #Germany out of control, #Merkel is blamed for the #migration chaos https://...
Example correction (translation)*: Use of rumor or rather false reports in the Chemnitz events has been
strategic. The fabricated narrative of the murder victim defending women from sexual assault by Iraqi man is
propagated by right wingers across Europe, including XXX. https://...
*censored to maintain anonymity
Keywords: defending a woman, defend a woman, protecting a woman, protect a woman, save a women,
saving a woman, woman assaulted, protect women, stop a sexual assault, prevent a sexual assault, sexual
assault prior to stabbing, defending women, harasses woman, harasses women, harass woman, harass
women
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Appendix B: Codebook for Coding Behaviors.

Question

Correction

Hedge

Speculation

Rumor

Table B1. Codebook with Category Descriptions, Anchor Examples and Coding Rules (Anchor
Examples are Tweets from the Data Set, URLs Shortened)
Description: Tweets treating the rumor as a fact.
Anchor example (translation): Chemnitz TÃ¤ter: Vorbestrafter Asylbewerber, schrieb auf FB: Ich
werde euch tÃ¶ten https://... (Chemnitz perpetrator: asylum seeker with criminal record, wrote on
FB: I will kill you https://...)
Coding rule: Tweets are coded as rumor if misinformation is stated without a doubt. Information in
a tweet that is not concerned with rumor is ignored.
Description: Tweets developing or supporting growing rumor, often introducing new information or
commentary.
Anchor example (translation): Angeblich st er enttarnt! Der HitlergruÃŸ zeigende von #Chemnitz
soll T****** V****** heiÃŸen und ist freier Journalist bei SZ, Spiegel, Stern und die Zeit. Er provozierte
auch mit Rufen wie "Unser Motto heiÃŸt TÃ¶ten" und Ã¤hnliche Parolen... https://... (Supposedly
uncovered! The one performing the Hitler salute in #Chemnitz is allegedly called T****** V****** and
works as a free journalist for SZ, Spiegel, Stern und Zeit. He was provoking with calls like “Our
theme is to kill” and similar slogans)
Coding rule: Tweets are coded as speculation when misinformation is not presented as a fact but
rather as an assumption. Rumors are not actively questioned. Information in a tweet that is not
concerned with fake mews is ignored.
Description: Tweets spreading rumors without a clear challenge but expressing doubts about its
veracity.
Anchor example (translation): Ob in Chemnitz eine deutsche Frau belÃ¤stigt von auslÃ¤ndischen
Demonstranten ist nicht bewiesen Aber auch das Gegenteil ist nicht bewiesen ich verstehe nicht
warum die Medien sagen dass es nicht bewiesen ist es ist eine einseitige Beschwichtigung (It is not
proven whether a German woman was assaulted by foreign demonstrantors. However, the opposite
is not proven either. I do not understand why the media say that it is not proven. It’s a biased
conciliation.)
Coding rule: Tweets are coded as hedge when they express doubts about the veracity without
actively challenging rumor or asking for more information. Information in a tweet that is not
concerned with the rumor is ignored.
Description: Tweets that correct a rumor and clearly negate it.
Anchor example (translation): Die Facebook-Übersetzung beim mutmaßlichen Täter in
#Chemnitz ist blanker Unsinn. Schlicht falsch übersetzt. Die richtige Übersetzung lautet: "Ich
vermisse Euch, meine Freunde." https://... (The Facebook translation of the alleged perpetrator in
#Chemnitz is pure nonsense. Plainly translated wrongly. The correct translation is: “I miss you, my
friends.” https://...)
Coding rule: Tweets are coded as correction when rumors are corrected and the information is
clearly negated. Tweets stating correct information without referring to any rumors relevant for this
study are not included in this category (see neutral/others). Information in a tweet that is not
concerned with rumor is ignored.
Description: Tweets that actively question and challenge a rumor's veracity or asking for
confirmation but not correcting it.
Anchor example (translation): #chemnitz nach GerÃ¼chten in Facebook gibt es zwei Tote auf
dem Volksfest . Einer der Schwerstverletzten soll ebenfalls verstorben sein. Kann das die Polizei so
bestÃ¤tigen oder gibts auch hier eine Nachrichtensperre. Konnte noch keine verifizierte Quelle
finden. (#chemnitz there are rumors about two victims during the folj festival. One of the severly
injured allegedly died as well. Can the Police confirm this or is there a gagging order. I was not able
to find verified sources.)
Coding rule: Tweets are coded as question when they not only express doubt about its veracity
(see hedge) but actively challenge it or when the user asks for more information. Information in a
tweet that is not concerned with rumor is ignored.
Description: Tweets related to a rumor but that cannot be assorted to the other categories.
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Anchor example (translation): 22.05.2017 Manchester Terroranschlag, 3 Tage spÃ¤ter gedenkt
man der 22 Opfer und die die Menge singt “Don't look back in Anger g”. 25.9.2018 #Chemnitz
Messerattacke 1 Toter, 3 Tage spÃ¤ter hetzt die Menge und ruft zur Jagd auf Migranten auf.
#kaltland #AfDwirkt (22.08.2017 Manchester terrorist attack, 3 days later people commemorate the
22 victims and the crowd is singing “Don’t look back in anger”. 25.09.2018 #Chemnitz knife attack 1
victim, 3 days later the crowd is chivvying and calls for hunting down immigrants #coldland
#AfDtakeseffect)
Coding rule: Tweets are coded as neutral/other when they are connected to rumor (e.g., by stating
correct information but without referring to misinformation). Information in a tweet that is not
concerned with rumor is ignored.
Description: Tweets unrelated to rumor (noise).
Anchor example (translation): 2 tote Geschwister-Babys - Massen-Gentest unter MÃ¼ttern im
Erzgebirge https://… (2 dead sibling babys – mass genetic testing among mothers in the Ore
Mountains https://...)
Coding rule: Tweets were coded as unrelated(noise) when they did not contain any information
about rumor relevant for this study.
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Appendix C: User Archetypes, Behavior Degrees, and Centrality
Measures
Table C1. Top Users by In-degree, Archetype, Behavior, and Network Centralities
Top

Archetype

Behavior

degi

CB

CC

vE

Number of knife stabs
1

Public person (politician) (A)

Rumor

447

0

0

1

2

Private person (A)

Rumor

252

0

0

0.58

3

Public person (politician) (B)

Rumor

102

0

0

0.26

4

Private person (B)

Rumor

76

68.5

1

0.17

5

Private person (C)

Rumor

58

57.0

1

0.13

6

Private person (D)

Rumor

40

0

0

0.09

7

Private person (E)

Rumor, question

32

0

0

0.08

8

Public person (politician) (C)

Rumor

30

0

0

0.07

9

Private person (F)

Rumor

29

111.5

0.57

0.07

10

Public person (politician) (D)

Rumor, neutral/other

26

25.0

1

0.06

Number of victims
1

Governmental organization (A)

Correction

429

0

0

1

2

Public person (politician) (B)

Rumor, question

357

0

0

0.84

3

Private person (F)

Rumor

146

0

0

0.34

4

Public person (journalist) (A)

Correction

93

0

0

0.22

5

Public person (politician) (C)

Neutral/other

41

0

0

0.10

6

Deleted (A)

Neutral/other

39

0

0

0.09

7

Deleted (B)

Rumor

31

0

0

0.07

8

Private person (G)

Rumor

17

0

0

0.04

9

Public person (politician) (E)

Rumor

16

0

0

0.04

10

Private person (H)

Neutral/other

16

0

0

0.04

Table C2. Top Users by In-degree, Archetype, Behavior, and Network Centralities
Travel warning
Top

Archetype

Behavior

degi

CB

CC

vE

1

Private person (I)

Neutral

159

0

0

1

2

Media organization (A)

Neutral

115

0

0

0.72

3

Media organization (B)

Correction, neutral

110

0

0

0.70

4

Public person (politician) (F)

Neutral

68

0

0

0.45

5

Private person (J)

Rumor

38

0

0

0.25

6

Media organization (C)

Rumor

33

0

0

0.21

7

Deleted (B)

Rumor

28

0

0

0.20

8

Private person (K)

Rumor

23

0

0

0.14

9

Private person (L)

Speculation

19

0

0

0.12

10

Public person (journalist) (B)

Neutral

19

0

0

0.12
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Table C3. Top Users by In-degree, Archetype, Behavior, and Network Centralities
Top

Archetype

Behavior

degi

CB

CC

vE

Victim protected woman (GER)
1

Deleted (C)

Rumor

107

0

0

0.58

2

Other (A)

Correction

90

0

0

1

3

Other (B)

Rumor

75

0

0

0.91

4

Private person (M)

Rumor

53

0

0

0.29

5

Private person (N)

Rumor

35

0

0

0.19

6

Public person (journalist) (C)

Rumor

32

0

0

0.18

7

Private person (O)

Rumor

24

0

0

0.13

8

Private person (P)

Rumor

13

0

0

0.07

9

Deleted (D)

Rumor

12

0

0

0.08

10

Private person (Q)

Rumor

12

10

1

0.06

Victim protected woman (ENG)
1

Other (C)

Rumor

50

0

0

1

2

Media organization (D)

Speculation

48

0

0

0.96

3

Private person (R)

Correction

10

0

0

0.20

4

Public person (journalist) (D)

Correction

10

0

0

0.20

5

Media organization (E)

Correction

8

0

0

0.16

6

Media organization (F)

Correction

7

0

0

0.14

7

Private person (S)

Rumor

7

0

0

0.14

8

Private person (T)

Rumor

6

0

0

0.12

9

Deleted (E)

Rumor

5

0

0

0.10

10

Private person (U)

Rumor

4

0

0

0.08
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